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MICHAEL A. BECKER AND ERNESTO J. SANCHEZ*
I. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
A. THE UNITED STATES AND UNCLOS
Supporters of the United States' accession to the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) made little progress in 2009, despite a new administration
in the White House and a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress.' Like the
Clinton and Bush administrations before it, the Obama administration expressed strong
support for U.S. accession to the Convention. 2 This was not a surprise. For more than a
decade, the Convention has received enthusiastic endorsements from a wide range of in-
terest groups, including the military and diplomatic corps, the shipping industry, oil and
gas concerns, and enviromnentalists. 3 Moreover, melting ice in the Arctic and potential
opportunities for the United States to secure rights to previously inaccessible oil and natu-
ral gas deposits seemingly provided new momentum to the cause.
But competing legislative priorities, including comprehensive health care reform, cli-
mate change legislation and an overhaul of the financial regulatory system ultimately left
little opportunity to move the Convention through committee to a full vote on the floor
of the U.S. Senate, despite plans to do so.4 While there are plans to try again in 2010,
* Michael A. Becker is an associate at Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP in New York and Co-Chair
of the Law of the Sea Committee. Ernesto J. Sanchez is a Washington, D.C.-based lawyer and contributed
the sections on maritime piracy and the International Court of Justice.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/unclose.pdf [hereinafter UNCLOS.
2. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated unequivocally in her confirmation hearing that U.S. accession
to UNCLOS would be a priority for the Administration and that joining the Convention was "long overdue."
See Allison Winter, Sen. Kerry Looks For Window To Ratify Law of the Sea, N.Y. TMEs, May 7, 2009, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/07/07greenwire-sen-kerry-looks-for-window-to-ratify-law-of-th-
12208.html. Secretary Clinton reiterated the Administration's position in a letter dated October 26, 2009 to
Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and offered "strong
support for U.S. accession to the convention" in advance of future hearings. See also Letter from Hillary
Clinton, Sec'y of State, to John Kerry, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Relations (Oct. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/ClintonToKerryLugar- 160ct09.pdf.
3. See Scorr G. BORGERSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT No. 46, 3 n. 4 (2009).
4. See Winter, supra note 2; see also Lauren Morello, U.S. Pushes for Law of the Sea Ratification as New Arctic
Mapping Project Begins, N.Y. TiiEs, July 29, 2009, at Al.
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mid-year elections may complicate such efforts; moderate senators facing re-election will
likely find themselves under pressure from the determined minority of senators that has
successfully thwarted previous efforts to join the Convention with a barrage of arguments
that a former Bush Administration official described as "inaccurate, outdated, or
incomplete."5
B. RATIFCATION OF UNCLOS AND RELATED AGREEMENTS BY OTHER STATES
While the United States maintained its outlier status, the Dominican Republic, Chad,
and Switzerland each acceded to the Convention in 2009, which has now been joined by
159 countries and the European Union. 6 In addition, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Tuvalu each
ratified the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention Relat-
ing to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks.7 That instrument now counts seventy-six states parties.8
Notably, a new treaty aimed at closing ports to ships involved in illegal fishing was
opened for signature in 2009. The Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing was approved by the gov-
erning conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, a U.N. agency, on Novem-
ber 25, 2009.9 Parties to the agreement commit to preventing vessels engaged in illegal
fishing practices from entering their ports or introducing their illegal catch into interna-
tional markets-a significant development considering the traditional emphasis on flag
state monitoring.'o The agreement, which has already been signed by the United States
and the European Union, will enter into force once twenty-five countries have ratified it.
C. COMMIssION ON THE LIMIrs OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
International law provides that coastal states have sovereign rights to the exploration
and exploitation of resources in the continental shelf extending as far as 200 nautical miles
from the country's coastal baseline.l" The state can claim an "extended continental shelf'
if it can provide geophysical evidence of a "natural prolongation" of the continental shelf
beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.12 Extended continental shelf claims are administered
5. John B. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the Law of the Sea Institute,
Berkeley, Cal. (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/index.php?module=News&func=display&
sid=83.
6. See Div. for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Sea, United Nations, Chronological List of Ratifications of
Accessions and Succession to the Convention and the Related Agreements as of 08 January 2010, http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological_1ists of-ratifications.htm#TheUnitedNationsConventionon
theLawoftheSea (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Chronological List].
7. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 198 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks,
Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/
fish stocks-agreementdeclarations.htm.
8. See Chronological List, supra note 6.
9. Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregu-
lated Fishing, Nov. 18-23, 2009, C 2009/LIM/Il-Rev.1., available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/faolmeeting/
018/k6339el.pdf.
10. Id.
11. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 56, 76.
12. Id.
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by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an independent body
established pursuant to UNCLOS.
In 2009, the CLCS continued to review pending applications and received fifty new
complete submissions and thirty-nine preliminary submissions-more submissions than the
CLCS had received in its entire history.13 The dramatic increase reflected the fact that
May 2009 marked the end of a ten-year submission deadline for many states.' 4 The high
volume of submissions, which relate to claims from all over the world, raised serious con-
cerns about the capacity of the CLCS to issue recommendations in a timely manner. Pre-
vious reports had estimated that it could take as many as twenty-five years to process the
current backlog.15 Efforts to expand capacity, for example, by creating additional sub-
commissions to review the applications remain under consideration.16 Furthermore, as
described below, the CLCS announced that it had suspended indefinitely a pending appli-
cation by Myanmar due to an ongoing maritime delimitation dispute with Bangladesh.17
I. Developments in the Arctic
A. U.S. ARCTIC POLICY
In its waning days, the administration of President George W. Bush announced a new
U.S. Arctic policy that broadly set forth "American military, economic, and diplomatic
priorities in increasingly accessible Arctic waters."' 8 The first such review since 1994, the
presidential directive noted that "[t]he United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and
compelling interests in the region." The review described "[f]reedom of the seas" as "a
top national priority" and stated that the United States would "assert a more active and
influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power
throughout the region."S It also described the need to "develop greater capabilities and
capacity" in the region, but failed to provide details on additional funding to expand the
existing U.S. fleet of ice breakers-one of the current limitations on U.S. capacity in the
region. 20
13. See Press Release, Secretary of Commission, Press Conference by Secretary of commission on Limits of
Continental Shelf (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2009/
090513_Sea.doc.htm [hereinafter CLCS Press Release]; see also Div. for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Sea,
United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/commissionsubmissions.htm (last visited Jan. 12,
2010) (regarding the status of pending submissions).
14. States must submit applications to the CLCS within ten years of the entry into force of UNCLOS for
that state. However, for states that joined the Convention prior to May 13, 1999, the ten-year period was
reset to that date, which marked the first issuance of scientific and technical guidelines relating to the applica-
tions. See CLCS Press Release, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. William Boot, Weekly Business Roundup, THE IRRAWADDY, Nov. 21, 2009, http://www.irrawaddy.org/
article.php?art id=17262&page=2. See also notes 46-59, infra.
18. Andrew C. Revkin, Ice Retreat Prompts Bush Shift in Arctic Policy, N.Y. TuLsEs, Jan. 13, 2009; see Directive
an Artic Region Policy, 45 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 47 (2009), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/docu-
ments/ArcticPolicyWhite House.pdf [hereinafter Arctic Policy].
19. See Arctic Policy, supra note 18.
20. Thomas Omestad, Bush Signs Off On New U.S. Arctic Policy, U.S. NEWVS & WORLD REP., Jan. 12, 2009,
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/01/12/bush-signs-off-on-new-us-arctic-policy.html.
SPRING 2010
522 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
B. COMMERCIAL PASSAGE THROUGH THE NORTHIERN SEA ROUTE
Meanwhile, new scientific data confirmed that temperatures continued to rise and sea-
sonal ice cover continued to decrease in the region. The United States Geological Survey
reported that "in the past 30 years, average temperatures in the Arctic have increased at
almost twice the rate of the planet as a whole." 21 This has resulted in the "substantial
retreat and thinning of the Arctic sea ice cover." 22 It has also opened up new possibilities
for commercial and military transit of two historically ice-covered waterways: the North-
west Passage (a series of straits and channels through the northernmost section of North
America) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's northern coast.
Significantly, in August 2009, two German-owned ships-the Beluga Fraternity and Be-
luga Foresight-obtained the necessary permits from Russian authorities to successfully un-
dertake and complete what was reported to be the first transit of the NSR by a non-
Russian commercial vessel. 23 Historically, Russia has required its own commercial vessels
to pay a tariff and to accept the assistance of state-operated icebreakers when transiting
the NSR.24 The Belga vessels, which transited the NSR while en route from South Ko-
rea to the Netherlands, were accompanied by a Russian icebreaker for a significant por-
tion of the voyage. 25 While this may represent the opening of the NSR to seasonal
commercial traffic on a semi-permanent basis, it remains to be seen how Russia will bal-
ance its right to exercise regulatory authority over the route with the freedom of naviga-
tion principles enshrined in UNCLOS and customary international law.26
m. Conflicts At Sea
A. SOUTH CHINA SEA INCIDENT
In March 2009, tensions flared between the United States and China when five Chinese
vessels reportedly blocked and surrounded the U.S.N.S. Impeccable, a U.S. surveillance
ship, operating approximately seventy-five miles south of Hainan Island in the South
21. U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Climate Change Science Project, Past Climate Variability and Change in
the Arctic and at High Latitudes (Jan. 2009), available at http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sapl-2/
sap -2-final-report-all.pdf.
22. Id.
23. German Ships Successfully Make "Arctic Passage," RitrERs, Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/idUSTRE58B0lK20090912 [hereinafter German Ships]. However, at least one report suggested that two
other non-Russian commercial vessels transited the route in 1997. See Andrew C. Revkin, Commercial Arctic
Passage Nearing Goal, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 2009, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/commercial-
arctic-passage-nearing-goal/.
24. Claes Lykke Ragner, 'DEN NORRA SJOVAGEN' [THE NORTHERN SEA RotrE] IN BARENTs-ETrr
CRANSLAND I NORDEN (Torsten Hallberg ed., 2008), available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/clr-norden-nsr-
en.PDF.
25. See German Ships, supra note 23.
26. The prospect of the "first foreign commercial traffic to ever pass along the route" was cited by retired
diplomats in a July 10, 2009 letter to the National Security Adviser urging U.S. accession to UNCLOS.
Letter from Retired Diplomats, to General James Jones, Nat'l Security Adviser (July 10, 2009), available at
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/Wirth-et-al-toGenJones-LOS_7-10-09.pdf (urging U.S. accession
to UNCLOS).
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China Sea.27 A spokesperson for the U.S. Navy claimed that the Chinese had attempted
to use a grappling hook "to snag a cable that the Impeccable was using to tow an underwa-
ter listening device known as a Surtass array," and one of the Chinese vessels reportedly
came within twenty-five feet of the U.S. vessel. 28 In response, the Impeccable, which
carried no armaments, attempted to repel the Chinese vessel with fire hoses, causing the
Chinese crewmembers to strip to their underwear. 29 The U.S. Navy then dispatched a
guided-missile destroyer to the region to protect the Impeccable for the duration of its
mission.30
In the confrontation's immediate aftermath, China accused the United States of violat-
ing international law by "conduct[ing] activities in China's exclusive economic zone in the
South China Sea without China's permission." 31 Other comments by Chinese officials
indicated that China considered the Impeccable to have exceeded the limits of innocent
passage. 32 But under international law, as codified by UNCLOS, the regime of innocent
passage applies only to vessels transiting the territorial sea, which extends twelve nautical
miles from the coast, or an international strait.33 By contrast, the Impeccable was operat-
ing in China's 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), where vessels are entitled
to the same navigational rights that apply on the high seas. 34 As one U.S. based commen-
tator explained, "[t]he U.S. was collecting undersea data that is related to war-fighting and
is not banned by the treaty rules covering exploitation of resources in the economic
zone. . . . The Chinese are just angry that the U.S. Navy can watch them." 3  Others
characterized the incident as "legal warfare" or "lawfare"-a broad strategic effort by China
"to shape international opinion in favor of a distorted interpretation of the Law of the Sea
by shifting scholarly views and national perspectives away from long-accepted norms of
freedom of navigation and toward interpretations of increased coastal state sovereign au-
thority." 36 Through such efforts, "[tihe goal is to renegotiate the essential bargain of the
Law of the Sea Convention through a patient, persistent effort at reinterpretation."37
27. Mark McDonald, U.S. Navy Provoked South China Sea Incident, China Says, N.Y. TImps, Mar. 10, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10iht-navy.4.20740316.html [hereinafter U.S. Navy Pro-
voked]; see also Mark Thompson, Behind the Sea Spat Between the U.S. and China, TIME, Mar. 12, 2009, http://
www.time.com/time/world/article/0, 8 59 9,1884724,00.html.
28. McDonald, supra note 27. Notably, Hainan is the site of a large and growing underground naval facility
for Chinese submarines, including the new Shang-class nuclear-powered attack subs. Thompson, supra note
27.
29. James Kraska, Sovereignty at Sea, 51 SURVIVAL 13 (2009), available at http://pdfserve.informaworld.
com/833757 731219516 911401097.pdf.
30. Ann Scott Tyson, Destroyer to Protect Ship Near China, WAsI. Posr, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20 0 9/ 0 3/1 2/AR 20 0 90 3 1203264.html.
31. McDonald, supra note 27.
32. Kraska, supra note 29, at 13.
33. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 3, 17, 19, 45.
34. See id. arts. 58, 87.
35. Thompson, supra note 27.
36. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, China Wages Maritime 'Lawfare', FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 11, 2009,
http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 2 0 09 /03/11/china-wages maritimelawfare (explaining that China is
by no means the only state that has tried to engage in "lawfare" to extend coastal state control by imposing
navigational restrictions within the EEZ). See also Kraska, supra note 29, at 16-17.
37. Kraska, supra note 29, at 16.
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B. NORTH KOREA AND U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1874
In May 2009, North Korea received harsh international criticism after conducting an-
other nuclear test, its frst since October 2006.38 In particular, the U.N Security Council
issued Resolution 1874, which imposed an enhanced package of sanctions and called upon
United Nations members "to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the
high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the
cargo of such vessels" includes materials relating to nuclear proliferation or other prohib-
ited armaments.39 Resolution 1874 further directed that if the flag state fails to consent to
a high seas inspection, the flag state instead "shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appro-
priate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities." 40 If the
flag state refuses to cooperate entirely, such conduct is to be reported to the Security
Council.41 Notably, the resolution did not authorize the use of force and did not provide
a legal basis for the inspection of non-consenting North Korean ships.42 It did, however,
require states to refrain from providing bunkering services, such as the provision of fuel or
supplies, to North Korean vessels suspected of transporting illicit cargo. 43
Just days later, the new international sanctions regime reportedly deterred the Kang
Nam 1, a North Korean vessel, when it reversed course while en route from North Korea
to Myanmar, allegedly with a shipment of banned cargo that included rifles and rocket
launchers."4 The U.S. Navy had been tracking the vessel.45 Later in the summer, United
Arab Emirates authorities seized an Australian-owned ship, the Bahamian-flagged ANL-
Australia, which was allegedly carrying a North Korean cargo of illicit weapons to Iran.46
C. BAY OF BENGAL MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE
In October 2009, Bangladesh initiated separate international arbitrations pursuant to
the dispute resolution provisions of UNCLOS against Myanmar and India to resolve
38. North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test, BBC NEWS ONLINT, May 25, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
8066615.stm.
39. S.C. Res. 1874, 12, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1874 fQune 12, 2009), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/NO936849.pdfOpenElement [hereinafter S.C. Res. 18741.
40. Id. 13.
41. Id. 16. Notably, North Korea's test was followed only weeks later by the announcement that South
Korea had official endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI") Statement of Interdiction Principles.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of State, ROK Endorses Proliferation Security Initiative Principles (May 26,
2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2009/05/123842.htm (explaining that the PSI is an infor-
mal multinational network of states aimed at disrupting the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction).
42. Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Security Council Pushes North Korea by Passing Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2009, http://www.nytimes.con/2009/06/13/world/asia/13nations.html.
43. See S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 39, 1 17.
44. Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Says Freighter From North Turns Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/asia/07korea.html.
45. Id.
46. Australia Probes North Korea Weapons for Iran Seizure, REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2009, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57TOYG20090830.
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long-standing maritime boundary disputes in the resource-rich Bay of Bengal. 47 All three
states are parties to UNCLOS.
The commencement of proceedings was just the latest development in a dispute that
previously gained widespread attention in late 2008, when Bangladeshi warships were
deployed to confront ships from South Korea's Daewoo Group engaged in oil and gas
exploration on Myanmar's behalf, and accompanied by Myanmar warships, in disputed
waters.48 Earlier in 2008, Bangladesh had auctioned off exploration rights to undersea
territory that it claims, a move that Myanmar had immediately protested. 49 A flurry of
high-level diplomatic talks at the end of 2008 prevented the dispute from escalating into
military conflict at that time.
Meanwhile, Myanmar made a submission to the CLCS on December 16, 2008 for the
extension of its continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal.so The submission expressly
claimed that "the area of continental shelf that is the subject of this submission is not
subject to any dispute between Myanmar and other States," noted only that
"[d]elimitation negotiations between Myanmar and Bangladesh are ongoing," and con-
cluded that the submission therefore "has been made without prejudice to the eventual
delimitation."5i
Bangladesh submitted a strongly-worded rejoinder to Myanmar's submission. 52 Specif-
ically, Bangladesh claimed that "the unresolved delimitation in the Bay of Bengal" clearly
did constitute a dispute under the Rules of Procedure of the CLCS, which thus required
the CLCS to refrain from considering the submission.53 Otherwise, Bangladesh asserted,
the CLCS risked "endorsing disputed baselines," despite it having "no competence over
questions of baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." 54 The
issue remained unresolved when Myanmar made a formal presentation in support of its
submission to the CLCS in August 2009,ss but the CLCS formally suspended its consid-
eration of Myanmar's claim as of November 18, 2009.56
47. Press Release, Foley Hoag LLP, Foley Hoag Retained by Bangladesh for Arbitrations against India and
Myanmar over Boundaries in Bay of Bengal's Resource-Rich Waters (Oct. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Foley
Hoag].
48. Alan Johnson, Bangladesh and Burma in Oil Row, BBC NEws ONINrE, Nov. 13, 2008, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7706261.stm; Simon Roughneed, Burma, Bangladesh Border Build Up, ISN SECURITY
WATCH, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.globalpolicy.org.
49. Huma Yusef, Bangladesh-Burma (Myanmar) Maritime Boundary Dispute Escalates, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2008/1104/p 9 9sOl-duts.
html.
50. See CONTINENTAL SHELF SUSBMISSioN OF UNION OF MYANMAR: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Dec. 2008),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/submissionsfl1es/mmr08/mmr es.pdf.
51. Id. at 3-4.
52. Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the U.N. Secretary General (July 23,
2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clesnew/submissions-files/mmr08/clcsl62008-mmrbgd-
e.pdf.
53. Id. 2, 8.
54. Id. $ 5.
55. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, CLCS/64, 9 35-40 (Oct. 1, 2009).
56. UN. Body Defm Action on Myanmar's Territorial Waters Claim, LIDo-BURMA NEwS, Nov. 18, 2009,
http://www.indoburmanews.net/archives-1/2009/november-2009/un-body-defers-action-on-myanmar-s-ter-
ritorial-waters-claims/ [hereinafter UN Body].
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In the interim, Bangladesh initiated the above-referenced arbitrations against Myanmar
and India. Counsel for Bangladesh, the Washington, D.C.-based law firm Foley Hoag,
noted that "foreign oil companies holding exploration licenses from Bangladesh, including
ConocoPhillips and UK-based Tullow Oil plc, have been intimidated by warships from
Myanmar within waters Bangladesh claims as its own."57 Furthermore, as a result of ne-
gotiations with Myanmar and India that, according to Foley Hoag lawyer Paul Reichler,
have been "deadlocked for years," the "exaggerated claims of Myanmar and India [. . .]
have effectively prevented Bangladesh from exploiting potentially huge deposits of oil and
natural gas located off its coast."58
Bangladesh's complaint against Myanmar focuses on the alleged granting of concessions
to territory that Bangladesh claims as its own, while the complaint against India states that
India has denied Bangladesh "any portion of its continental shelf whatsoever beyond 200
nautical miles" in a manner "inconsistent with the principles and rules established by UN-
CLOS."s5 While Myanmar was reportedly "disappointed" by the decision to initiate pro-
ceedings, Indian authorities noted that the arbitration could finally settle the long-running
"tripartite maritime dispute."60
IV. Maritime Piracy
As of October 2009, global piracy figures had already surpassed the total number of
attacks reported in 2008. The Piracy Reporting Centre of the International Chamber of
Commerce's International Maritime Bureau reported 306 incidents over the first nine
months of 2009, as opposed to 293 for all of 2008.61 This increase was directly attributed
to heightened piracy activity off the coast of Somalia, where forty-seven attacks occurred
in the first nine months of the year, compared to twelve for the same period in 2008.62
Somali pirates also attacked ships in the Gulf of Aden, the shipping lane connecting the
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, with 100 incidents occurring in the first three quarters of
2009 versus fifty-one for the same period in 2008.63
The situation continued to draw extensive international attention, with foreign navies
heightening their presence in the region. And the criminal prosecution of captured So-
mali pirates, one in the United States and others in Kenyan courts, represent significant
rule of law developments.
A. MuLnLATERAL RESPONSE
The U.N. Security Council adopted three resolutions in 2008 with the aim of encour-
aging states to take a more proactive role in ensuring maritime security off the Somali
57. Foley Hoag, supra note 47.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. UN Body, supra note 56.
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coast.64 In 2009, another resolution called on Somali pirate groups to support the 2008
Djibouti Agreement, an accord between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
and an opposition alliance for the cessation of hostilities in Somalia. 65
A multinational naval response, already in progress, continued. On January 8, 2009, the
U.S. Navy announced the formation of Combined Task Force 151, a twenty nation naval
coalition that would engage in counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast.66 Japan,
South Korea, and China also dispatched ships to the region.6 7
At the non-military level, international donors, at a U.N.-sponsored conference on
April 23, 2009, pledged over US$250 million to aid the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia.68 These funds included $134 million to increase the African Union (AU)
peacekeeping force in the region from 4,350 troops to 8,000 troops and $31 million for
Somali security forces.69 The U.N. Secretary General told the conference that piracy was
"a symptom of anarchy and insecurity on the ground" and that enhanced "security on the
ground will make less piracy on the seas."70 Somali President Sharif Ahmed received loud
applause after promising to do "everything imaginable" to stabilize Somalia and stating
that "[i]t is our duty to pursue these criminals not only on the high seas, but also on terra
firma."71 That said, one news report stated that these "comments may ignore reality"
given that pirate leaders enriched with ransom money may wield more power than Presi-
dent Ahmed's "shaky government." 72
B. THE MV MAERSK ALABAMA HUACKING CASE
Perhaps the most notable attack of 2009 was the seizure of the cargo ship MV Maersk
Alabama almost 300 miles off the Somali coast by four pirates on April 8, 2009, the first
such occurrence involving a ship registered under the American flag since the early nine-
teenth century.7 3 Following stiff resistance from crewmembers who managed to capture
64. See S.C. Res. 1816, J9 7, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 Oun. 2, 2008) (authorizing states cooperating
with Somalia's transitional government to "[e]nter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of re-
pressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea"); S.C. Res. 1838, 1%] 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7,
2008) (calling upon interested states "to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the
coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft" to the region); S.C. Res. 1846,
6, 9, 14, 15, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008) (generally calling on states to cooperate in facilitating
the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy).
65. See Agreement Between The Transitional Federal Government Of Somalia And The Alliance For The
Re-Liberation Of Somalia, June 11, 2008, available at http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Reposi-
tory%20UNPOS/080609-FinalsignedagreementbetTFG&ARS(36).pdf.
66. U.S. To Lead New Anti-Pirate Force, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 8, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/781761 Lstm.
67. See Japan To Deploy Ships Off Somalia, BBC NFws ONLuNE, Jan. 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7855120.stm.






73. Edmund Sanders & Julian E. Barnes, Somali Pirates Hold U.S. Captain, L.A. TLMEs, Apr. 9, 2009, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/world/fg-somali-pirates9; See also Larry McShane, Navy Ship Arrives to Aid
American Crew That Fought off Somali Pirates, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/
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the pirates' ringleader temporarily, the pirates kidnapped the ship's captain and fled on a
lifeboat.74 A U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Bainbridge, was subsequently dispatched to
the vicinity. 75 While the MV Maersk Alabama then continued to its ultimate destination
in Kenya, a three-day cat-and-mouse game of negotiations and minor skirmishes between
the Navy and the pirates ensued, culminating with Navy SEAL snipers killing three pi-
rates on the lifeboat and facilitating the captain's rescue.76
A fourth pirate who had previously surrendered to the Navy for medical treatment on
account of earlier struggles with the ship's crew, Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, was trans-
ported to New York and charged with piracy and other crimes in federal court-the first
U.S. piracy prosecution in over a century.77 The federal statute underlying the piracy
charge is clear: "Whoever on the high seas commits the crime of piracy as defined by the
law of nations and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States shall be im-
prisoned for life."78
C. KENYAN PimAcY COURTS
Other states involved in anti-piracy efforts off the Somali coast have also prosecuted
piracy suspects accused of attacking their nationals in their own courts. But under agree-
ments with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, Kenya has
emerged as the venue of choice for Somali piracy cases.79
In principle, this development is consistent with the UNCLOS provision stating that
"[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."80 But despite the
existence of Kenyan statutes defining piracy as a crime punishable by life imprisonment,
Kenya has not redrafted its laws to reflect its ratification of UNCLOS.8 1 Concerns have
also been raised that the agreements between Kenya and other countries that authorize
such prosecutions have been negotiated in secret and without approval by the Kenyan
parliament. 82 A U.S. Coast Guard expert noted that justifying Kenya's prosecution of
piracy suspects presents a "pretty daunting" challenge because a case may concern U.S.
Navy personnel "involved with Somali pirates who may have attacked a Panamanian vessel
with a Filipino crew being tried in a Kenyan court."83 One news report called the impris-
news/national/2009/04/08/2009-0 4-
08 somali.pirates-seize-.usflagged-cargoshipwith_2 1_american.sailors.saysdiplomat.html.
74. U.S. Negotiators Try to Persuade Pirates to Free Captain, CNN ONLINE, Apr. 10, 2009, http://
www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/09/ship.hijacked/index.html.
75. See id.
76. US. Captain Rescued from Pirates, Apr. 13, 2009, BBC NEws ONLINE, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/af-
rica/7996087.stm.
77. Benjamin Weiser, Pirate Suspect Cbarged as Adult in New York, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 2009, at Al, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/22/nyregion/22pirate.htm.
78. Piracy Under Law of Nations, 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2009).
79. Jeffrey Gettleman, Rounding Up Suspects, the West Turns to Kenya as Piracy Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 24, 2009, at AS, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/world/africa/24kenya.htnl.
80. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 100.
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oned piracy suspects "guinea pigs in an experiment in international law" assisted by cor-
rupt Kenyan government officials who will divert to themselves foreign aid meant to
improve the Kenyan judicial system.84 It remains to be seen whether the Kenyan piracy
courts will serve the cause of the international rule of law or give rise to a series of messy
jurisdictional nightmares.
V. Dispute Resolution
A. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The International Court ofJustice (ICJ) rendered final judgments in two cases concern-
ing maritime boundary issues in 2009.
1. Romania v. Ukraine
In 1997, Romania and Ukraine signed a treaty reaffirming their existing borders and
agreed to commence negotiations concerning each state's EEZ and the pertinent conti-
nental shelf on the Black Sea.s5 Maritime delimitation was economically significant to
both states because it would determine each nation's respective right to develop oil and
gas reserves potentially located on the continental shelf.86 The Court ultimately made
straightforward use of the equidistance method to establish a single Black Sea boundary
between Romania and Ukraine, beginning in the northwestern part of the Black Sea near
the eastern Romanian coast and extending roughly parallel to the Sea's northern and east-
ern coastlines respectively. One commentator noted that the Court's decision remains
unlikely "to stir much excitement or controversy within the delimitation community."87
The 1997 treaty provided for resort to the Court in the event of unsuccessful delimita-
tion negotiations, a reason Romania cited for initiating proceedings in 2004.88 Romania
and Ukraine, in a 2003 treaty, had been able to agree only that the outer limits of their
respective territorial seas intersected at a point roughly to the west of Ukraine's uninhab-
ited Serpents' Island, located approximately twenty nautical miles east of the Danube
River delta's land boundary terminus. 89 The Court, mainly on the basis of the 2003
treaty, held that a final delimitation would begin at that point, referred to as Point 1.90
84. Id.
85. Treaty Between Romania And Ukraine On The Romanian-Ukrainian State Border Regime, Collabora-
tion and Mutual Assistance On Border Matters, art. 2, June 2, 1997, 2159 U.N.T.S. 335.
86. See, e.g., Black Sea Debate Rolls On, ENERGY IN EAST EUROPE, Sept. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
21685589.
87. Coalter G. Lathrop, International Decision: Maritime Delimitation in The Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),
103 Am. J. IN-r'L. L. 543, 547 (2009). Essentially, the equidistance method involves the drawing of "an equi-
distant median line between two countries with opposite continental shelves." Dabney Welsh, Access To Our
Backyard Reserves: A Final Resolution Of The Gulf OfMexico's Maritime Boundaries, 23 Hous. J. INTL. L. 609,
633-34 (2001); See also UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 15.
88. Application Instituting Proceedings, Maritime Delimitation In The Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.) 11 3 (Sept.
16, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/8268.pdf.
89. Collaboration and Mutual Assistance on Border Matters, art. 1, Rom.-Ukr. June 17, 2003, 2277
U.N.T.S. 3, 1 21.
90. See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), (Feb. 3, 2009) 11 55-66, available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf.
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But the subsequent proposed delimitations proceeded in different directions primarily on
account of the states' disagreements over the relevance of Serpents' Island to the boundary
line.9'
Romania's proposed delimitation proceeded from Point 1 (which Romania identified in
its submissions to the Court as Point F) along a twelve nautical mile arc denoting the
Serpents' Island territorial sea limit, then in a straight, eastward direction until reaching
the line equidistant between the states' adjacent coasts. 92 This delimitation proceeded
further along the line equidistant between the states' adjacent coasts until reaching the
line median between the states' opposite coasts.93 The delimitation thereafter followed
the line median between the states' opposite coasts to one final point in the center of the
Black Sea.94
Ukraine's proposed delimitation, however, allowed Romania far less maritime territory.
From Point 1, the Ukrainian delimitation, disregarding the Serpents' Island arc, went in a
nearly perfectly southward direction, following a relatively short median line between
Romania's mainland coast and the Serpents' Island coast.95 The delimitation then turned
a bit more to the southeast, but still ended west of the Romanian delimitation at "a point
where the interest of third States [i.e., Bulgaria to the west and Russia to the east] poten-
tially come into play."96
The Court first addressed what segments of coastline were relevant to delimitation "in
order to determine what constitutes in the specific context of a case the overlapping
claims" in regard to EEZs and to have a basis for ensuring that the ratios of each state's
coastal length and maritime areas falling on either side of the delimitation would not be
disproportionate. 97 To this effect, the Court found that the entire Romanian coast should
affect the delimitation.98 But the coasts of Ukraine's Yahorlyts'ka Gulf at the mouth of the
Dnieper River to the northeast and the Karkinits'ka Gulf further south, with the Crimean
Peninsula jutting out westward from the southern end, should not, the Court concluded,
because they faced each other and did not "project in the area to be delimited."99 The
Court also found that the Serpents' Island coastline was "so short" that it made "no real
difference [in determining] the overall length" of the states' coasts for purposes of the
delimitation. 00
These considerations underlay the Court's three-stage delimitation methodology.
First, the Court identified "the appropriate points or points on the [states'] relevant coast
or coasts which mark a significant change in the direction of the coast, in such a way that
the geometrical figure formed by the line connecting all these points reflects the general
direction of the coastlines."' 0 Forming a three-point provisional equidistance line, the
Court selected two base points on the Romanian coast and three base points on the
91. See id. 11 179-188.
92. Id. 1 12.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. 1 13.
96. Id.
97. Id. T 78.
98. Id. 1 88.
99. Id. ff 98-114.
100. Id. 1 102.
101. Id. T 127.
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Ukrainian coast. 102 Next, the Court, on the basis of the 2003 treaty, made minor adjust-
ments to the equidistance line to start the final boundary at Point 1.103 No other factors
(e.g., disproportionate coastal lengths, conduct of the parties, security considerations, the
presence of Serpents' Island in the delimitation area) necessitated, in the Court's view,
further such adjustments. The ultimate ratios of the coastal lengths for and the relevant
area between Romania and Ukraine respectively-1:2.8 and 1:2.1-also satisfied the Court
that no disproportionality would result from the final delimitation." 
The final delimitation line, then, began at [Point F] and followed the twelve nautical
mile Serpents' Island arc briefly until the intersection with the line equidistant from the
adjacent Romanian and Ukrainian coasts. 05 Following that equidistance line eastward
until it became affected by the base points on the opposite Romanian and Ukrainian
coasts, the delimitation line subsequently turned in a southerly direction to follow the line
equidistant between these opposite coasts.10 6 The delimitation line ended at the point in
the Black Sea "beyond which the interests of third States may be affected." 07
This decision continues the Court's use of equidistance as "the general rule for the
delimitation of [a state's] territorial sea," without giving the method rigid priority over
other delimitation approaches in regard "to fixing an all-purpose boundary covering the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf." 08 Nonetheless,
Ukraine, from a territorial standpoint (i.e., obtaining territory from which to drill for oil
and natural gas reserves), won a clear victory in this case.
2. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua
On September 29, 2005, Costa Rica initiated proceedings concerning navigational and
related rights on the section of the San Juan River running along the Nicaraguan border
from an inland point eastward to the Caribbean Sea.109 An 1858 Treaty of Limits (Treaty)
had established Nicaragua's dominion and sovereign jurisdiction over the river itself, but
also affirmed Costa Rica's navigational rights on the river's lower area. 0 The legal bases
of these rights and their precise extent, however, remained in dispute for over a century
thereafter."' In its application instituting proceedings, Costa Rica specifically cited re-
102. Id. 1 154.
103. Id. f 205-209.
104. See id. 1J 215-216.
105. Id. 206.
106. Id.
107. Id. 1 209.
108. Pieter Bekker & Ana Stanic, The ICJ Awards Sovereignty over Four Caribbean Sea Islands to Honduras and
Fixes a Single Maritime Boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras, ASIL INSIGIrrs, Oct. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/2007/10/insightsO71017.html (commenting on Territorial and Maritime Dis-
putes Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, 2007 I.CJ. 120 (Oct. 8, 2007)).
109. Dispute Regarding Navigational And Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) (July 13, 2009) 11, available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/15321.pdf.
110. Id. 1 19.
111. The Court summarizes several historical episodes concerning the dispute between Costa Rica and Nic-
aragua over navigational rights on the San Juan River, including an 1888 arbitration award regarding the
Treaty rendered by U.S. President Grover Cleveland, a 1916 ruling by the Central American Court ofJustice
that Nicaragua's grant of rights to the United States to build an inter-oceanic canal through the river violated
the Treaty, a 1956 agreement to facilitate and expedite river traffic, and several other incidents whereby
Nicaragua supposedly infringed upon Costa Rican navigational rights. See id. $1 20-27.
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strictions on the navigation of Costa Rican boats and their passengers on the river by
Nicaraguan authorities since the late 1990s, evidenced through the imposition of charges,
obligations to stop for identification at Nicaraguan military posts, limitations to free
moorage, and other measures hampering "free and expeditious transit."l1 2
The Court concluded that the Treaty defined the law governing the immediate dispute
by granting Costa Rica a perpetual right of navigation along the pertinent segment of the
river "con objetos de comercio," a phrase that both states translated differently.1"3 Costa
Rica's translation of the phrase's first three words-"con objetos de" or "for the purposes
of"-was, in the Court's view, more accurate in giving the whole phrase a "coherent mean-
ing." Nicaragua's proposed translation to this effect-"with articles of"-did not make as
much sense in context (i.e. perpetual right of navigation "with articles of commerce" vs.
perpetual right of navigation "for purposes of commerce.").114
In addition, the Court found that because the Treaty was entered into for an unlimited
duration, the meaning of the term "commerce" would evolve according to when the
Treaty was applied and would not be restricted to the meaning understood at the time of
ratification. Consequently, the Court found that "commerce" encompassed the transpor-
tation of persons, which could be commercial in character if a price was paid to the carrier,
and not just the transportation of goods.'" 5
Other Treaty provisions, the Court held, allowed for the navigation of vessels belonging
to inhabitants of villages on the Costa Rican riverbank for such everyday necessities as
taking children to school or obtaining medical treatment.'' 6 But, as a general rule, the
Court also found that navigation by Costa Rican vessels for other purposes, such as police
patrols, that had no connection to financial gain did not qualify as activities undertaken
"for purposes of commerce" under the Treaty." 7
In the Court's view, then, Nicaragua could regulate Costa Rican navigation so long as
the exercise of free navigation "for purposes of commerce" was not hampered and the
regulations were legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and reasonable." 58 The Court also held
that Nicaragua was obligated to notify Costa Rica of such regulations, but not necessarily
prior to their adoption."l 9 Nicaragua could also lawfully stop and request identification of
boat passengers, require departure clearance certificates for reasons of navigational and
environmental safety, prohibit nighttime navigation, and require Costa Rican vessels to fly
the Nicaraguan flag.120 But Nicaragua could not impose visa or tourist card requirements,
charges for departure clearance certificates, or restrictions on subsistence fishing in the
river by Costa Rican nationals.121
112. Application Instituting Proceedings (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) 1 8, (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/8268.pdf.
113. See id. $ 36-37, 42-45.
114. Id. 1 52.
115. See id. TI 63-71.
116. See id. 1 73-79.
117. See id. 9 80-84.
118. See id. TI 86-87.
119. See id. 93 91-97.
120. See id. I9 103-110, 125-132.
121. See id. 9 111-124, 134-144.
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Only some of these conclusions were unanimous, with two judges appending separate
opinions and one judge ad hoc appending a declaration.122 On the whole, however, the
decision did not arouse much controversy in the highest levels of either the Costa Rican or
Nicaraguan governments. One major Costa Rican newspaper called the decision "Solo-
monic."l 23 And Costa Rican Foreign Minister Bruno Stagno commented approvingly on
the judgment, while Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega stated: "We have all won
here."1 24
B. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)a5 heard no new cases in
2009. Notably, however, the Tribunal amended its rules regarding the posting of a rea-
sonable bond in prompt release cases. 126 Specifically, the Tribunal sought to address the
fact that in two of its prompt release cases-the M/V "SAIGA " Case and the "Juno Trader"
Case-several months passed before the seized vessels were released by the detaining states
in compliance with the Tribunal's rulings. These delays were attributed to practical diffi-
culties relating to providing the required financial security. As a result of the recent
amendments, "the Tribunal now has the option to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether a bond or other financial security is posed with the detaining states or with the
Registrar of the Tribunal." 27 In short, this will prevent a detaining state from refusing to
accept (or otherwise not promptly accepting) a duly-authorized financial guarantee to se-
cure the release.
122. See id. 1 146.
123. Erick Carvajal, La Haya probibe cobro de peaje a Costa Rica par navegar rio nicaraguense, AL Du, Sept. 14,
2009, 2009 WLNR 13373967.
124. Id.
125. For more information on ITLOS, see http://www.itios.org.
126. Statement by Judge Jorge Jose Luis Jesus, President of ITLOS, Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers of
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, New York, New York, Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (fol-
low "News" hyperlink, then follow "Statements of the President" hyperlink, follow "Statement Given to the
Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, New York, 27 October 2009" hyperlink).
Nine of the thirteen cases that ITLOS has heard since its establishment have involved the prompt release of
seized vessels. Id. President Jesus also stated that nine of the thirteen cases that ITLOS has heard since its
establishment have involved the prompt release of seized vessels. Id.
127. Id.
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